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CARLO SACCO, d/b/a SACCO'S 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE KEVIN YOST, a minor ) 
by and through his Guardian ) 
ad Litem, Charlene Yost, and ) 
CHARLENE YOST, individually, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/ ) 
Respondent, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
STATE OF UTAH, STEVE HAMMON, ) 
CARLO SACCO d/b/a SACCO'S ) 
PRODUCE, QUICK STOP, INC., ) 
a Utah corporation, and ) 
CHRIS L. PETERSEN d/b/a ) 
CHRIS'S, ) 
) 
Defendants/ ) 
Appellants. ) 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 16990 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The Plaintiff/Respondent, a minor, sought damages 
from the defendants for injuries caused by the defendants' 
illegal sales of alcohol to Respondent and other minors. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judge John F. Wahlquist.determined that the 
defendants were negligent in causing Respondent's injuries, 
each in the following degrees: 
Hammon 80% 
Chris's 10% 
5% Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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The Lower Court also found Respondent to have been negligent 
to the extent of 5%. Before the trial, a settlement was 
reached between Respondent and the defendant HAMMON and the 
Complaint was dismissed as against HAMMON. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have this Court disr~gard as 
unfounded the Appellant's claim of .not being a proper party 
defendant. 
Respondent also seeks this Court's affirmance of 
the Lower Court's finding that all of the defendants were 
negiigent. The Respondent agrees with the appellant in his 
assertion that the Lower Court under-assessed the State's 
negligence in this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent will not disagree with the substance of 
Appellant's statement of facts, except for the following 
qualifications and additions. 
Chris's is a family business, Chris L. Petersen 
being the father and head of that family. There was no 
evidence adduced at trial which could reasonably be con-
strued as showing Mr. Petersen to be other than a proper 
party defendant. 
on the date of the accfdent, Chris's and the State 
of Utah, as well as the other defendants, illegally sold 
alcohol to certain minors, the oldest of whom was then 
eighteen (18) years of age. The District Court concluded 
that.two of the three minors looked siqnificantlv vounaer Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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than they really were at the time of the illegal sales, ~nd 
that no reasonable and careful person could have mistaken 
the ages of any of the boys as being twenty-one (21). As a 
result of the defendants' illegal sales, they became intoxi-
cated. One of these intoxicated minors drove his vehicle 
over the side of a canyon road, over turned the truck and 
his passenger, the Respondent, was very seriously and perma-
nently injured. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT, CHRIS L. PETERSEN, IS A 
PROPER PARTY DEFENDANT. 
The Appellant contends that he, Chris L. Petersen, 
is not a proper party·defendant in this action. However, 
the Respondent in his Complaint sued not only Mr. Petersen 
as an individual, but also his family business "Chris's." 
Mr. Petersen was not a witness in the trial, but 
his wife, Carol Petersen, did give some testimony which is 
helpful on this issue: 
Q: "In addition to that, do you have any other 
avocation, other than your chosen profession?" 
A: "I work at our family business." 
Q: "And is that business known as 'Chris's'?" 
A: "Right." (T 190) 
Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states that, 
"When two or more persons associated in 
any business either as a joint stock company, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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a partnership or other association, not a 
corporation, transact such business under a 
common name, whether it comprises the names 
of such associates or not, they may be sued 
by such common name; and any judgment 
obtained against the defendant in such case 
shall bind the joint property of all the 
associates in the same manner as if all had 
been named defendants and all had been sued 
upon their joint liability." 
This Rule is controlling here to allow suit against Mr. 
Petersen and his business. 
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Rule 17(d) 
does not apply, the Appellant may not now prevail on his 
claim of being other than a proper party defendant. In his 
Answer the Appellant raised this claim as an affirmative 
defense. However, at trial there was no testimony suggesting 
that Mr. Petersen. is not a proper defendant. 
This Court in Booth v. Crompton, 583 P~2d 82 {Utah 
1978), at Note 2, stated that the proper construction of 
Rule 8(c) places the burden of proving an affirmative defense 
on the party asserting it. In failing to adduce the necessary 
evidence at trial, the Appellant failed to meet his burden. 
He may not now at this late date attempt to correct this 
defect by providing this Court with an Affidavit. 
Rule 8{f) states, 
"All pleadings shall be so construed as to 
do substantial justice.h 
The Respondent's purpose was to sue the entity, Chris's, 
which had made the illegal sale of alcohol. As father and 
head of that family, Mr. Petersen was properly made a party 
defendant. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE DEFENDANTS 
WERE NEGLIGENT, BUT IT UNDER-ASSESSED THE DEGREE 
OF THE STATE'S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
The appellant's brief points out to this Court 
some of the important fa~ts surrounding the State Liquor 
Store's improper and illegal sale of alcohol to the minors. 
Respondent agrees that the District Court's finding regarding 
the State Liquor Store's comparative negligence is grossly 
low when the facts surrounding respondent's injuries are 
considered. 
The basic purpose of the law prohibiting the sale 
of alcohol to minors is to protect those minors from their 
own lack of judgment and to protect society as well. The 
Legislature has invoked the State's police powe;s to control 
the dispensation of intoxicating liquors and UCA 32-1-2 (1953) 
requires that all laws and regulations relating to the sale 
and use of alcohol be liberally construed so as to protect 
the public health, peace and morals. As potential sources 
of alcohol to minors, the vendors have a strict responsi-
bility to ascertain whether or not purchasers are of legal 
age. If the person seeking to buy alcohol is under the age 
of 21, the vendor must refuse to make the sale. (See UCA 
32-7-15(1); 32-1-39.) Obviously, a prevayor of substances 
so potentially destructive as alcohol must have and use very 
good judgment with regard to who may receive the alcohol. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Sometimes a vendor can ascertain the age of the buyer by 
demanding to see the buyer's identification card. However, 
whenever the buyer's age may still be in question, the 
vendor must inquire beyond the allegation of age stated on 
the identification card and in such cases, the buyer must be 
required to sign a statement on a form provided by the 
Commissioner of Public Safety. (See UCA 32-9-9.) The 
State's negligence in this case was quite extreme in that 
not even the minimum requirements of law were met--no proof 
of age was requested of the minors at all. In this omission, 
the State was clearly remiss since as the District Court 
found, the young buyers looked even younger than they actu-
ally were. (Findings of Fact 1-2.) Of course, other vendors 
in this case were negligent and the District Court properly 
made that conclusion. 
In making its finding that the appellant was more 
n~gligent than was the respondent, the District Court appar-
ently adopted the thinking of the Court in Prevatt v. 
Mcclennan, 201 So. 2d 780, 781 (Fla. App. 1967) where that 
Court said: 
"Here the statute forbidding the sale of liquor 
to minors was violated and constitutes negligence 
per se. The statute t~at makes it a crime to sell 
intoxicants to minors was doubtless passed to 
prevent the harm that can come or be caused by 
one of immaturity by imbibbing such liquors. The 
very atmosphere surrounding the sale should make 
it forseeable to any person that trouble for some-
one was in the making. 
"The proximate cause of the injury is the sale 
rather than the consurnpti~~~~-~Emnhasis ann~n ~ Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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In light of the fact that the State Liquor Store 
sold five (5) "fifths'' of wine without requiring ID to boys 
who looked younger than they actually were, it was quite 
inconsistent of Judge Wahlquist to find the appellant Chris's 
twice as negligent as was the State of Utah. By the same 
token, it was inapproprfate for the District Court to hold 
that the defendant State of Utah was not more negligent than 
was the young respondent. 
The State of Utah and the other defendants were 
negligent as a matter of both fact and law. It was factu-
ally unreasonable for the defendants, including the State, 
to have sold such a large quantity of alcohol to boys who 
appeared to be well under the legal age. It was simply 
unreasonable to think that such boys could find safe and 
proper use for such quantities of alcohol. Moreover, the 
mere fact of having made the sale to the minors was negli-
gence as a matter of law. The Legislature has recognized a 
basic disability of people under the age of 21 in relation 
to alcohol. This disability is an inherent incapacity to 
use proper discretion. 
Judge Wahlquist's Memorandum Decision shows his 
attempt at balancing the various factors from which the 
parties' comparative negligence could be derived. As stated 
before, it seems unreasonable that the appellant Chris's 
could have been twice as negligence as was the State. 
However, it was equally unreasonable that the Lower Court 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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did ~ot find all of the defendants more negligent than was 
the respondent. 
Several jurisdictions have adopted a view which 
would have made all of the defendants more negligent as a 
matter of law than was the respondent in this case. For 
example, in so·ronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 
218 A.2d 630, (1966), the Court disallowed a claim of con-
tributary n~gligence where a tavern keeper had negligently 
sold alcoholic beverages to a physically intoxicated person. 
The Court held that contributory n~gligence would not apply 
in such a situation and its rationale is equally applicable 
to our case. That Court said at 218 A.2d 636: 
"Since the patron has become a danger to himself 
and is in no position to exercise self-protective 
care, it is right and proper that the law view the 
responsibility as that of the tavern keeper alone." 
In our case, since the law's purpose is to impose 
upon vendors of alcohol the responsibility of protecting 
minors from their inherent incapacity to take self-protective 
care, the best view is that the vendors of alcohol must 
assume full responsibility for injuries caused by the intoxi-
cation of their purchasing minors. 
Such a policy would very much discourage vendors 
from making illegal sales and the result would be a safer 
society. The problems of immature drinkers should be stopped 
at the main source--the vendors. 
In reaching a similar conclusion, one Court has 
said the following: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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"Nor can it be said that such a rule imposes ~n 
undue burden upon the tavern keeper, for, as the 
Supreme Court observed in Soronen, he 'may readily 
protect himself by the exercise of reasonable 
care.'" Aliulis v. Tunnel Hill Corp., 114 N.J. 
Super. 205, 275 A.2d 751, 753 (1971). 
The laws against selling alcohol to minors is in 
effect a safety law intended to protect minors and society 
from potential destruction. In Cappa v. Oscar c. Holmes, Inc., 
25 Cal.App.3d 978, 102 Cal.Rptr. 207 (1972), the Court dealt 
with a violation of safety laws on a construction site. Two 
boys had decided to take a shortcut through a construction 
site which lacked the necessary fences and railings. The 
defendant's only precautionary measure.was a sign stating, 
"Danger--Constru6tion Parking Only." Notwithstanding this 
sign, the boys walked.through the uncompleted construction 
site and one fell several feet, sustaining severe injuries. 
The Court said, 
"It is clearly the law that the defense of 
assumption of risk is inapplicable when the action 
is based on a violation of a safety law intended 
to protect the class in which a party is a member." 
The doctrine of estoppel would also require a 
finding that each defendant vendor of alcohol was more 
negligent than was the minor purchaser. This is true because 
the vendors are the primary and instigating causes of the 
respondent's injuries and had the illegal sales not been 
made to the minors, they would not have become intoxicated 
\ and consequently injured. 
"It is a maximum in the law of estoppel that 
where one of two innocent persons must suffer, 
he whose act occasioned the loss must bear it." 
,,, Assicurazioni. 175 Misc. 785, 25 
357 (1941). 
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The respondent does not claim that he was com-
pletely innocent of wrong doing in this case, but the vendors 
were each the more primary violators of the law and they 
should each bear the greater responsibility for the resulting 
injuries. None of the defendants, including the State of 
Utah, is immune from the doctrine of estoppel. See Shafer 
v. State of Washington, 521 P.2d 735 (1974). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Chris L. Petersen, who does business as 
"Chris's" is properly a party defendant in this action. 
This conclusion is grounded on Rule 17(d), Rule 8(f), and 
this Court's construction of Rule 8(c) as set forth in 
Booth v. Crompton, 583 P.2d 82 (Utah 1978) at Note 2. 
All of the defendants were more negligent than was 
the Respondent for injuries occurring to Respondent as a 
result of the defendants' ill~gal sales of alcohol. This 
conclusion is true a fortiori with regard to the State of 
Utah who itself caused the violated law to be enacted and 
who must now be estopped from claiming any contributory 
fault on the part of Respondent. It was also unreasonable 
for the Lower Court to have found the State of Utah only 
half as negligent as was the appe~lant Chris's. 
It is the vendors who control, in large measure, 
who ultimately will have access to intoxicants. Holding the 
vendors fully responsible for negligently selli~g to minors 
will greatly increase the likelihood of compliance with the 
law. Compliance with the law will Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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society from the minors' lack of judgment with respect to 
intoxicants. 
Comparative negligence should not be allowed to 
defeat Respondent's claim for recovery as against any 
defendant who has violated the laws relating to the sale of 
alcohol. 
Respectfully submitted 
d 8' day of September, 
1980. 
RIC ARD RICHARDS 
Attorney for Plaintiff /Respondent 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of ~e 
foregoing Respondent's Brief to the following this B7 day 
of September, 1980: 
Pete N. Vlahos, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant 
Joseph c. McCarthy, Esq. 
Attorney for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol Bldg. 2447 Kiesel Ave. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 ~ _Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114 
. './A,u.u_; Q ~ 
Secretary 
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